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Introduction 
 
 
Japan After Two Years of “Abenomics” 
Monetary Illusions, Timid Reforms: So Far, Prime Minister Abe’s Economic Policy 
Has Missed Its Mark 
Hanns Günther Hilpert 
When Shinzo Abe became Prime Minister of Japan in December 2012, he raised great 
economic expectations. He promised a radical turnaround in monetary policy, long-
term fiscal consolidation, and structural reforms to revive the economy. Two years on, 
the interim results of “Abenomics” are sobering. Despite unprecedented monetary ex-
pansion and vigorous fiscal stimulation, Japan has been unable to overcome deflation 
and weak growth. And although the consumption tax has been increased, the country 
is far from achieving sustainable budget consolidation. Abe has also failed to deliver 
on his promise to introduce groundbreaking structural reforms aimed at stimulating 
growth. Why have these goals not been achieved? In light of Japan’s large – and grow-
ing – national debt and its ageing population, what other economic policy options can 
be pursued? 
 
Japan’s economy has never really recovered 
from the bubble shock of the early 1990s, 
when an unparalleled real estate and stock 
market bubble burst. The results included 
high household and corporate debt, a crip-
pling banking crisis, and a steady decrease 
in Japan’s potential growth from its pre-
vious level of 4 percent to 1 percent. Only 
by filling the demand gap through fiscal 
spending largely on construction projects – 
some of them absurd – did Japan manage to 
avoid sliding into a depression. As a result, 
the International Monetary Fund calculates 
that Japan’s national debt rose to 245 per-
cent of GDP. On the other hand, the Bank 
of Japan, the country’s central bank, was 
unable to avoid mild deflation, even with a 
vigorously expansive monetary policy. At 
the same time, more and more Japanese 
found themselves in precarious employ-
ment; income and wealth disparity steadily 
grew. 
As the political-social consensus that had 
shaped Japan’s traditional “growth coali-
tion” of LDP policymakers, bureaucrats and 
business leaders disintegrated, established 
interest groups turned to defending their 
own vested rights. The process of creative 
destruction necessary to initiate reforms 
and change – for example breaking up car-
tels and oligopolistic structures or chang-
ing the corporate governance of Japanese 
companies – has still failed to materialize. 
The temporary change of leadership in 2009, 
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which put the Democratic Party (DPJ) in 
office for three years, was unable to pro-
duce the game-changing reforms, structur-
al transformation and economic upswing 
many had hoped for. 
“Three Arrows” for Japan’s 
Economic Reform 
With his promises of professional govern-
ance and sustainable economic improve-
ment, Shinzo Abe, who had already served 
as Prime Minister in 2006/2007, won a land-
slide victory in the Lower House Elections 
of December 2012. As a result of his victory 
the Liberal Democrats (LDP), who had ruled 
the country almost without interruption 
from 1955 to 2009, returned to power. Abe 
announced that he would fight deflation 
with aggressive monetary policy, stimulate 
the economy by means of expansive fiscal 
policy, and overcome investment blockades 
through structural reforms. By using the 
popular “three arrow metaphor to explain 
his economic and business cycle policies, he 
delivered a clear message: the penetrating 
power of coordinated monetary, fiscal and 
structural policy would restore the country 
economically and make it strong again. 
Japan, the world’s third-largest economy, 
fifth in the world in exports, the seventh-
largest recipient of foreign investment and 
second in the world in patent registrations, 
was to regain its status as a “first-tier nation”. 
But it was obvious from the start that 
the Three Arrows differed substantially in 
terms of importance and size. Structural 
policy reforms initially consisted of nothing 
more than announcements, and fiscal 
expansion, in classic manner, benefitted 
primarily domestic construction firms. The 
shift in monetary policy, by contrast, was 
tantamount to an institutional and mon-
etary revolution. Although the independ-
ence of the Bank of Japan, which oversees 
monetary policy, is enshrined in law, Abe 
quickly managed to overcome resistance to 
the change in monetary policy – by means 
of political pressure and the rotational 
appointment of a new governor and two 
members of the central bank’s Monetary 
Policy Board. 
The reshuffled Policy Board, under the 
new leadership of Governor Haruhiko 
Kuroda, announced in April 2013 that it 
would achieve an inflation rate of 2 percent 
within two years through quantitative and 
qualitative monetary expansion (QQME). 
The new monetary base target was to be 
doubled from ¥138 trillion (end of 2012) 
to ¥270 trillion (end of 2014) – regardless 
of how interest rates developed. Thus the 
monetary base to GDP ratio, which was al-
ready at an unprecedented level, was to be 
doubled to nearly 60 percent. Internation-
ally, up until 2007 monetary base to GDP 
ratios of 5-10 percent were common. This 
shows how the Japanese central bank was 
breaking new ground. The quantitative 
monetary expansion was implemented (and 
continues to be implemented) by purchas-
ing Japanese government bonds, including 
long-term ones maturing in six to eight 
years, in order to qualitatively influence the 
long-term capital market interest rate. 
With this new policy, the Bank of Japan 
aims to drive down long-term interest rates, 
support the development of tangible assets, 
and suppress the external value of the yen. 
In this way, the Bank intends to bolster over-
all economic demand and defy deflationary 
expectations among economic actors. The 
chain of effects is intended to lead to higher 
good prices, stronger wages, greater invest-
ment, and increased durable goods pur-
chases. The macroeconomic demand gap 
would be filled. 
Mixed Interim Results 
Macroeconomic development: After two 
years of economic policy under Abenomics, 
there is no sustainable recovery in sight for 
Japan’s economy, despite the fact that mon-
etary and fiscal policy got off to a brilliant 
start initially. Central bank governor Haru-
hiko Kuroda’s announcement of a monetary 
turnaround was effective, particularly as 
the government and parliament passed two 
supplementary budgets. Shortly thereafter, 
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share prices rose, business confidence im-
proved, bond yields fell – and the yen con-
tinually reached new lows. Thanks to strong 
consumption growth rates, residential con-
struction and public investments, real GDP 
growth increased by 1.6 percent in 2013. 
The positive development in business activ-
ity reached its climax in the first quarter of 
2014. At the time, consumers preferred to 
purchase durable goods ahead of the im-
pending consumption tax raise from 5 per-
cent to 8 percent. As a consequence, the 
economy grew by 2.4 percent in real terms 
over the previous quarter. But following 
the tax increase that took effect on 1 April 
2014, private consumption and business 
activity went into a downright tailspin. In 
the following two quarters, the economy 
slid into negative territory. Once again 
Japan found itself temporarily in recession. 
According to preliminary Cabinet Office 
statistics, for 2014 as a whole, GDP just 
barely maintained the level of the previous 
year (+0.0 percent). 
Price development and monetary policy: 
It still remains to be seen whether the defla-
tionary price trend can be halted. In the 
course of the monetary expansion, the in-
flation rate as measured by the consumer 
price index (CPI) has indeed returned to 
positive figures; in April 2014 it peaked at 
2.1 percent. But subsequently the inflation 
rate fell again, and with it fell the credibil-
ity of the Bank of Japan, prompting Gover-
nor Kuroda to further intensify the expan-
sive money growth. On 31 October 2014 he 
announced plans to increase the monetary 
base to GDP ratio to 70-75 percent. To this 
end, the central bank promised to raise the 
annual purchasing volume of long-term 
Japanese government bonds from ¥50 to 
¥80 trillion and to directly or indirectly 
bolster the real estate and stock markets. 
As it did in 2013, the expansive monetary 
policy had a direct impact on the financial 
markets: returns dropped to nearly 0 per-
cent, stocks rose again, and the yen con-
tinued to lose value. Due to sinking oil 
prices, however, the inflation rate slid back 
into the negative range, reaching –0.4 per-
cent in December 2014. This time the real 
economy showed no response, since there 
were no fiscal stimuli at first. Private house-
holds simply lacked the purchasing power 
necessary to boost consumption. In 2014 real 
wages sank once again. Due to rising infla-
tion, nominal wages stagnated or grew only 
insignificantly for 2014 as a whole. Add to 
this the devaluation of the yen and plummet-
ing interest rates on savings and it becomes 
clear that under these conditions, consump-
tion is unlikely to pick up anytime soon. 
Employment and the labor market: 
Japan’s absolute number of workers reached 
a new high in 2014. Unemployment fell to 
3.4 percent in December. The downside 
of this positive trend in the labor market is 
that regular employment has been declin-
ing for more than twenty years. At the 
moment 21 percent of men and 55 percent 
of women are in more or less precarious 
employment. They earn considerably less 
than regularly employed workers, are 
not protected against dismissal, and have 
limited access to social benefits. The rise in 
irregular employment is partly responsible 
for the fall in real wages and for Japan’s 
slow productivity growth. Without a guar-
antee of long-term employment, companies 
are reluctant to invest in training and edu-
cation. When companies have difficulty 
covering costs or maintaining their com-
petitive edge, they replace regular employ-
ees with irregular workers instead of 
investing in measures designed to increase 
productivity. 
National budget and fiscal policy: In con-
trast to 2013, when additional spending 
financed by supplementary budgets stimu-
lated the limping economy, in 2014 fiscal 
policy was focused on consolidation. The 
above-mentioned increase in the consump-
tion tax led to an economic crash. Due to 
the shortfall in tax revenue, the national 
budget deficit, at 7.1 percent – as a share of 
GDP – was still comparable to that of 2013 
(8.3 percent). Gross national debt grew to 
a record 245 percent of GDP (138 percent 
net). In the meantime fiscal policy is once 
again expanding. 
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Foreign trade: Japan’s trade balance 
was already deep in the red in 2014, with a 
deficit of $108 billion. Its current account, 
however, posted an esstimated $45 billion 
surplus due to substantial asset gains from 
abroad. Japan’s hitherto legendary struc-
tural trade surplus has become a structural 
trade deficit. Three factors are responsible 
for this development. First, Japanese com-
panies have transferred twenty percent of 
their production overseas out of cost and 
marketing considerations. Second, the 
nuclear power plants that were shut down 
after the Fukushima catastrophe have been 
replaced by imported fossil fuels. And third, 
many export articles have run into unex-
pected sales problems. For these reasons, 
a devaluation of the yen now has a much 
weaker impact on Japan’s exports than it 
did in the past. A 36-percent devaluation of 
the yen against the dollar (from the begin-
ning of 2013 to the end of 2014) led to a 
substantial export plus, but imports also 
increased. There was no net gain derived 
from exports. 
Structural reforms: The Abe administra-
tion has initiated a series of reforms, but 
so far there has been no spectacular break-
through that could spur economic growth 
or sustainably stimulate potential growth. 
Rather, the reform process follows in the 
footsteps of yesteryear – haltingly and 
gradually, the Japanese government and 
the private sector continue to adapt to the 
changes and competitive challenges of 
globalization. On a positive note, Abe’s 
structural policy pursues laudable objec-
tives, such as promoting the professional 
advancement of women, strengthening 
shareholder rights vis-à-vis corporations 
and institutional investors, and promoting 
investment through liberalization and 
deregulation, for instance in the agricul-
tural and energy sectors. The measures 
introduced thus far include the liberaliza-
tion of land acquisition, which is intended 
to facilitate the creation of larger, more 
profitable agricultural areas; the expansion 
of daycare and after-school programs; the 
establishment of six special economic zones 
governed by liberal labor and zoning laws; 
the promotion of exports and foreign in-
vestment; the drafting of a corporate gov-
ernance codex; and – following the British 
model – the introduction of individual 
savings accounts as a new pillar of pension 
insurance. 
Economic Reform as a Catalyst for 
Conservative-national Policies 
However mediocre the current economic 
balance of Abenomics may be – politically it 
is a success. At the very start of his term of 
office, Abe sparked euphoria by making use 
of the “three arrow” metaphor and demon-
strating economic resolve. It seemed reason-
able to hope for an end to the stagnation. 
Proponents of Abenomics continue to domi-
nate economic discourse. In Japanese media 
as well as in public opinion, the Abe admin-
istration is seen as competent, which – like 
in Germany – is the decisive parameter for 
general political support. To the present day, 
Prime Minister Abe has managed to pull off 
the feat of garnering approval rates of over 
40 percent. After he had surprisingly called 
snap Lower House Elections for 18 December 
2014, the opposition was unable to counter 
Abe’s dictum that there is “no alternative” 
to his economic policy. The governing coali-
tion of LDP and Komeito was thus able to 
maintain its two-thirds majority in parlia-
ment. But if one takes a closer look at the 
initiatives and actions in which Abe invests 
political capital, it becomes clear that his 
primary objective is not the recovery of 
the Japanese economy and certainly not 
the pushing through of structural reforms. 
Instead, the Prime Minister’s economic 
policy seems to be the means to an end. 
Abe’s main objective is to gain a free hand 
in security matters in order to pursue his 
“proactive pacifism” policy; establish a 
nationalist view of history; and instill patri-
otism in education policy. Economic policy 
serves as a sort of catalyst for these processes. 
As was the case under the premiership of 
Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006), Abe, too, is 
exploiting the reform narrative primarily 
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as a means of pursuing his conservative-
national agenda. 
However, Abe was not re-elected due 
to popular support for his political goals. 
Rather, Japan’s voters have given the Prime 
Minister a mandate to continue pursuing 
his economic policy and above all to intro-
duce growth-enhancing reforms. To make 
the country fit for the future, the govern-
ment would naturally have to broaden its 
agenda. Among the most urgent tasks are: 
halting the gradual erosion of Japan’s eco-
nomic competitiveness and its attractive-
ness as an investment and business loca-
tion; meeting the challenge of demographic 
change; and staving off national bankrupt-
cy. Against this background, it is prudent 
to weigh the prospects and risks entailed in 
Abe’s monetary, fiscal and structural policy 
– the Three Arrows of the Abenomics 
strategy. 
Monetary Policy: Halting 
Transmission, Growing Risks 
One can already say with certainty that 
central bank head Haruhiko Kuroda cannot 
keep his promise to achieve 2 percent infla-
tion in 2015. Furthermore, the theoretically 
forecasted chain of effects designed to even-
tually lead to greater spending by both firms 
and households has so far failed to materi-
alize. But the failure of Abenomics surely 
does not derive from hasty consumer tax in-
creases. Rather, it is rooted in a much more 
fundamental failure at the level of mon-
etary transmission. 
First, companies in Japan are not financed 
through stocks, as they are in the Anglo-
Saxon world, but rather by bank loans, as is 
the case in the Eurozone. Despite ultra-low 
interest rates, however, there has been very 
little growth in bank loans. Second, as men-
tioned above, real incomes and purchasing 
power have declined, above all due to wage 
stagnation. And third, Japanese exports 
have not grown nearly as fast as would have 
been expected following the devaluation of 
the yen. Moreover, it is important to ques-
tion whether the mild deflation is even the 
decisive cause of Japan’s long-standing 
growth weakness and persistent stagnation 
– or rather a symptom thereof. The monis-
tic monetary view can be countered by 
the argument that investors lack trust in 
Japan’s economic development for struc-
tural reasons and that Japanese consumer 
reluctance can be attributed largely to the 
fact that Japanese society is ageing. But 
monetary policy is ill suited to overcoming 
structural deficits or solving demographic 
problems. 
On the other hand, both theory and 
empirical studies show that the effects of 
expansive monetary policy can be unpre-
dictable and slow to materialize. So the last 
word on Abenomics has not yet been spoken; 
it remains to be seen how prices and macro-
economic expenditures develop. But even if 
it is still unclear for the moment how effec-
tive monetary expansion will turn out to 
be, one must not lose sight of the risks in-
volved. 
First, rising prices and nominal interest 
could quickly lead to a vicious circle in 
which returns on government loans and 
public debt charges drive one another up – 
Japan would suffer a sovereign debt crisis. 
Second, the extremely bloated monetary 
base could make it difficult to keep infla-
tion down. It is well known that the veloc-
ity of money is a factor that is difficult to 
control. One cannot rule out the possibility 
that galloping inflation and an internation-
ally falling yen could lead to a hard landing. 
Third, expansive monetary policy has a 
negative impact on the global economy. 
The devaluation of the yen harms the price 
competitiveness of Japan’s trade partners 
and – together with the euro, which is also 
flagging – threatens to spark an interna-
tional devaluation race. The yen-carry trade, 
i.e. financing investments abroad with cheap 
Japanese money, threatens to contribute to 
speculative bubbles around the world. And 
fourth, the reputation of the Bank of Japan 
could suffer long-term damage if it becomes 
a source of financial instability in itself. 
There is a real danger that Abe’s monetary 
policy – in addition to creating monetary 
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illusions – is also generating new, uncon-
trollable risks. 
Fiscal Policy: Stop-and-go under the 
Threat of Sovereign Default 
For decades Japan’s fiscal policy has been 
defined by a dilemma. On the one hand 
there is a need for continuous Keynesian 
demand stimulus; at the same time, how-
ever, the situation calls for fiscal retrench-
ment. This dilemma has now come to a 
head. In macroeconomic terms, Japan has 
not yet overcome its weak demand. Fiscal 
stimulus measures are continually required 
in order to stabilize the economy. The ¥3.5 
trillion stimulus package passed at the very 
end of 2014 is merely the latest episode 
in a series of stop-and-go policies applied 
in recent years. In the current legislative 
period, the governing coalition is expected 
to lower the maximum corporate tax rate 
(currently 35.6 to 39.5 percent) to strengthen 
the competitiveness and investment capac-
ity of domestic enterprises. 
At the same time, the extremely high 
national debt has forced the government to 
pursue fiscal consolidation. Japan’s finances 
threaten to spiral out of control. Since fiscal 
year 2010 the budget deficit has hovered be-
tween 7 and 10 percent of GDP. Gross nation-
al debt has risen to 245 percent – nearly 
the sum of the net financial assets of the 
private household sector in the country 
today. Amortizing the debts would require 
at least eight years’ worth of tax revenue, 
according to current estimates. So far 
domestic investors have financed the gov-
ernment’s deficit spending. Over ninety 
percent of Japan’s national debt is denomi-
nated in yen and is held domestically. But 
this is likely to change. In 2013 private 
households already stopped accumulating 
savings; their savings ratio has turned nega-
tive. What is more, the once high structural 
current account surplus is melting. Soon 
the state is likely to become dependent on 
foreign investors to finance both its budget 
deficits and its interest and amortization 
expenditures. 
In response to Japan’s fiscal dilemma, 
Abenomics promises stronger economic 
growth. The message is that a more favor-
able economic environment would not only 
generate greater tax revenue but also make 
it easier politically to push through higher 
tax rates and cut spending. This promise 
is tantamount to a wager on the future. 
Japan’s economy and public finances must 
be stabilized before risk surcharges on Japa-
nese government bonds rise to unsustain-
able heights. 
In this configuration, monetary policy, 
with its massive purchases of Japanese secu-
rities, has become a willing handmaiden of 
fiscal policy. The bond market has become 
the principal means of financing skyrocket-
ing government expenditures, while the 
share financed by tax receipts has fallen to 
less than 50 percent. In effect, the Bank of 
Japan is financing debt by printing money. 
Its monthly purchases of government bonds 
on the open market total ¥8 to ¥12 trillion 
(approx. €60 to €80 billion). According to 
media reports, the central bank absorbs 
approximately 70 percent of primary emis-
sions. Japanese pension funds are currently 
reducing their bond exposure, redirecting 
investments to the stock market and invest-
ing abroad. Market analysts estimate that 
at current rates, the Bank of Japan will hold 
approximately 50 percent of Japan’s govern-
ment bonds between 2017 and 2020. It is 
entirely possible that the central bank will 
at some point write off its government 
bond assets with the stroke of a pen, there-
by drastically reducing the national debt. 
The Bank of Japan’s involvement in the 
country’s bond markets entails dramatic 
side effects and risks. The overwhelming 
demand of the central bank has repeatedly 
driven returns to new lows – most recently 
to 0.01 percent for two-year government 
bonds, 0.08 percent for five-year bonds, and 
0.33 percent for ten-year bonds. Bond capital 
can be raised practically for nothing in 
Japan, which suspends the allocative func-
tion of interest on capital. Virtually un-
limited liquidity fuels speculative bubbles 
in Japan and around the world. 
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Little has been said about the exit strat-
egy. Will the Bank of Japan manage to end 
its expansionary open market policy in an 
orderly fashion? Or will it be a disorderly 
exit? The latter can happen if, for example, 
international hedge funds begin specu-
lating on rising bond yields by trading 
uncovered options – on foreign stock ex-
changes that cannot be controlled by the 
Japanese ministry of finance. 
At the same time, the massive purchases 
of Japanese government bonds do not exon-
erate the government from its duty to make 
use of the remaining window of opportuni-
ty and effect real economic consolidation. 
One thing is certain: the goal of achieving 
a balanced primary budget (i.e. excluding 
expenditures for interest and amortization) 
by fiscal year 2020 cannot be achieved. 
Not only must the current shortfall in 
revenues resulting from the weak economy 
be overcome – additionally, the second 
phase of the consumption tax raise has been 
postponed until April 2017. In the near 
future the Japanese government will have 
to tap into supplemental tax revenue – if 
only to offset the planned decrease in cor-
porate tax. 
Furthermore, in the middle to long term 
the Japanese tax system will definitely have 
to be restructured. The national budget will 
have to absorb not only rising expenditures 
but also the increasing cost of maintaining 
the public health system in order to pro-
vide sufficient care for the country’s ageing 
population. Today, 25 percent of the popu-
lation is over the age of 65. By 2035 this 
number will rise to 33 percent. In order to 
manage this burden in future, it will be 
necessary to raise the consumption tax to 
the European average and to expand the 
income tax assessment basis. From a present-
day perspective, neither of these measures 
stands much of a chance of being imple-
mented given the current political situation. 
Fainthearted Structural Policy 
Structural policy is the decisive component 
of any plan to revitalize Japan’s economy. 
While monetary and fiscal policy may be 
able to compensate for weak demand, 
greater potential growth can be achieved 
only by implementing supply-side measures. 
In order to attain strong sustainable eco-
nomic growth with substantial productivity 
advances, corresponding structural reforms 
are required. Prime Minister Abe has prom-
ised to implement the legislative and admin-
istrative proposals elaborated by the newly 
constituted Industrial Competitiveness 
Council. The proposals are aimed primarily 
at gradually improving professional oppor-
tunities for women; opening up the Japa-
nese market to agricultural imports in the 
framework of trade agreements with the 
USA and the EU; facilitating the hiring of 
skilled workers from abroad; and liberaliz-
ing the energy market. Also planned are 
selective measures in the agricultural and 
healthcare sectors and policies aimed at 
promoting innovation, tourism and SMEs. 
These reforms point in the right direc-
tion, but it would take much more to 
achieve substantial productivity growth. 
In order to regenerate its economy, Japan 
would need uniform labor laws capable 
of overcoming the duality between regular 
and irregular employment; shareholder-
friendly corporate laws that allow more 
restructuring and startups; and a breakup 
of insider structures in the country’s 
domestic industries. The latter requires 
effectively safeguarding against unfair 
competition, opening the market to foreign 
competitors, and ensuring that antitrust 
authorities are endowed with executive 
powers – and the will to use them. In the 
agricultural and healthcare sectors, not 
only selective but fundamental reforms are 
necessary. And in order to meet the chal-
lenges of an ageing society, the promotion 
of women and families would have to be 
expanded considerably, following the 
example set by Northern Europe. Further-
more, immigration laws would have to 
be relaxed and skilled workers actively 
recruited. 
In order to push through all these 
measures, the Abe administration would 
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have to break societal taboos and overcome 
resistance from bureaucrats as well as politi-
cal and economic interest groups. Given 
Abe’s conservative stance and the fact that 
his priorities lie elsewhere, such a pro-active 
strategy seems unlikely. Although the gov-
ernment has a mandate to carry out sub-
stantial reforms and disposes of the neces-
sary majorities in parliament, there is a 
danger that it will fail to act in time – and 
there is still time – to avert a financial and 
political crisis. 
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